The Supreme Court of India, on July 28, remitted the challenge to Notification under Section 17 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 and the Constitutional validity of Section 20, back to the Karnataka High Court.
Bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna opined that it would be appropriate to relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the writ petitions afresh including in relation to the question of constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act and the inapplicability of Section 17 of the Act.
Facts
The notification came to be challenged on two grounds. Firstly, that the impugned notification was issued without adequately considering the objections taken by the writ petitioners and in excess of the power vested in the authority.
Secondly, the lapsing of the acquisition whichwas in furtherance of the show cause notice issued under the 1973 Act on 14.10.1982.
Petitioners contended that acquisition had lapsed on account of efflux of time as 23 years had elapsed since the preliminary notification.
As regards the validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act, the challenge was essentially about the method of determining payment predicated therein to pay amount at the rate of three hundred times the property tax for acquiring the land under Section 17 of the 1973 Act and not fair market value of the property.
The single judge of the High Court had declared Section 20 to be ultra vires of the Constitution. However, the plea of the petitioners that notification under Section 17 had lapsed was declined.
Cross appeals against the decision of the single judge were filed. The Division Bench upheld the declaration given by the learned Single Judge that Section 20 of the 1973 Act was unconstitutional. However, the Division Bench modified the operative direction given by the learned Single Judge regarding method of determining the amount payable to the land losers in accordance with Sections 23 and 24 of the 1894 Act; and instead, it observed that such a direction would be beyond the purview of the Court’s jurisdiction and that it is always open to the State to bring suitable amendment to Section 20 of the 1973 Act.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Decision
The moot question in these appeals is about the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act.
The Court observed that as per the State, the 1973 Act and the provisions therein, in particular Section 20,it ought to enjoy the protection of Article 31C of the Constitution. The fact that the 44th Amendment to the Constitution came into force with effect from 20.6.1979 and the 1973 Act came into force much before that, would make no difference. For, even at that relevant time Article 31C was available as it had come into effect on 20.4.1972 to the extent, it has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala & Anr. 1973) 4 SCC 225.
It was also noted that the provisions of the 1973 Act are referrable to the expanse of Article 39(b) of the Constitution; and Section 20 is only a provision (means) to achieve that goal by following method to compensate the land loser — by offering amount of three hundred times the property tax payable in respect of such land.
The Court observed that the High Court’s conclusion that no protection of Article 31C was available to 1973 Act was unexceptionable.
The Court observed that the High Court had dealt with the issue of Section 20 of the Act in a casual manner.
The Court went on to say that a Constitutional court must examine the scheme of the 1973 Act, its objects and purposes as also the question: whether the payment of amount specified as three hundred times the property tax payable in respect of such land on the date of publication would be a permissible method of determination of the amount or is per se unjust, unfair or unreasonable.
The Court noted the fact that there is some time gap between the preliminary notice to show cause why the land in question should not be acquired and in issuance of the final notification under Section 17, by itself, cannot be a ground to declare the process initiated vide valid show cause notice as having lapsed by efflux of time.
In this regard, the Apex Court deemed the matter as a case fit for remitting it back before the High Court to consider it thoroughly.